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Abstract: Taking value as the socio-economic analogue of biological or cultural fitness, in this paper I study 
the interaction between individual-level and group-level explanatory mechanisms by considering what kind 
of intra-group relationship obtains given the nature of inter-group relationships. Specifically, I show that 
when value arises from appropriating resources from other groups, inter-group relationships are conflictual 
or war-like, with the consequence that intra-group relationships are centralized and hierarchical. When the 
value creation process involves niche-competition between groups, inter-group relationships are fission-
fusion with commitment and intra-group relationships are decentralized and egalitarian. Finally, when value 
derives from appropriating occasional benefits from cooperation, inter-group relationships are 
indistinguishable from intra-group relationships, and the latter are decentralized and hierarchical. Interpreting 
intra-group relationships as different forms of social order and the division of labour yields applications to 
political and economic institutions. Exploitation, a concept defined in the paper without recourse to the 
labour theory of value, is shown to be consistent with some of these institutions and, particularly, with the 
absence of explicit coercion. 
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Alberto Battistini,  Department of Economics, University of Siena;  e-mail: battisalb@unisi.it 1. Introduction 
 
Despite their wide variety, two elements occur in virtually every definition of institutions: 
that they are man-made and that they refer to distinct groups of people. Traditionally, the first 
element – human agency – has been emphasized by the economic approach, where social outcomes 
are explained in terms of the interaction among given individuals. The second – the power of 
structures – has instead been illuminated by sociology, where individual behavior is explained in 
terms of the primacy of given structural constraints such as shared beliefs,  internalized norms and 
cognitive scripts.
1  
Whilst the need to combine the two perspectives has long been recognized by modern 
sociology, the only formal treatment of the interaction between individual-level and group-level 
explanatory mechanisms has been provided by those biologists, anthropologists and economists 
who believe in group selection (Sober and Wilson, 1998; Enrich, 2004; Bowles et al., 2003). Here, 
group-beneficial-but-individually-costly traits (i.e., non self-interested cooperation) can evolve 
under the conditions favoring group selection over individual selection. As models based on various 
modifications of the Price equation (Price, 1970), such conditions are essentially those that increase 
trait variance among groups and reduce trait variance within the group, so that the pressure of the 
former is stronger than that of the latter (e.g. egalitarian distributive institutions).
2  
When such models are used, the analysis  is driven by the functionalist assumption that 
groups are optimally adapted to their environment and that the benefits of cooperation are equally 
shared among group members. A society with a higher proportion of altruism will indeed produce 
more (altruistic) replicas compared to a society with a higher proportion of selfish types, and 
therefore will eventually drive the latter to extinction. 
 As pointed out by the biologist Alexander (1987), however, in the case of humans the main 
hostile forces driving evolution have been other groups of humans, so that the issue of the 
interaction between individual- and group-level selection mechanisms cannot be divorced from that 
of conflict and exploitation both within and between groups. On the other hand, in order to know 
how those groups are internally organized – that is, their economic and political institutions – it 
seems sensible to know what other groups are doing, which in turn raises the question of the 
prevailing type of competition and the corresponding way in which value – the socio-economic 
analogue of fitness
3 – is created.  
Accordingly, in this paper I analyse the interaction between individuals and higher-order 
entities such as groups
4 in the simplest way: that is, by considering what kind of intra-group 
                                                 
1 There are of course exceptions to this rigid classification, the best known being the thought of Weber. In general, 
however, the border between the two disciplines has been set in terms of the two methodologies rather than in terms of 
the object of the analysis, as shown by Durkheim’s treatment of suicide as a social fact (Durkheim, 1897), or by 
Brennan and Tullock’s handling of military tactics in terms of the free-rider problem (Brennan and Tullock, 1982). As 
for institutions, luckily, there is instead increasing acknowledgment of the need to integrate methods from different 
disciplines in order to gain better understanding of the same subject. See  Hall and Taylor (1996), Hodgson (1998), 
Greif (2006), Powell and DiMaggio (1991), and Scott (1994).   
2 Interestingly, the nature of inter-group relationships is an important parameter in the works cited. Specifically, whilst 
fission-fusion mechanisms are necessary for biological evolution because, unless groups periodically re-form, the 
selfish type will eventually prevail within the group, frequent inter-group conflicts accelerate cultural evolution, since 
the most cooperative (and most successful) cultures can spread through conquest and assimilation. As will become 
clearer below, dropping the functionalist assumption and taking value as the determinant of what is most fit to evolve 
socially, the nature of inter-group relationships can be shown to give rise not only to cooperation but also to conflict and 
exploitation. 
3 I conceive socio-economic evolution in terms of a competitive value creation process occuring both within and 
between groups, rather than in terms of competitive reproduction within the same species as evolutionary biologists and 
anthropologists do. The sources of value I consider are ‘bioeconomically’ inspired, however. In the terminology of 
Ghiselin (1995), they correspond to opportunity pull and competitive push. See the next section. 
4 Drawing on sociology, I define higher-order entities as entities which are different from the sum of their components. 
While the terminology is deliberately flexible – for example, ‘groups’ may refer to individuals (as groups of organs), to 
society (the group of individuals under consideration), or, as most often in the paper, to aggregations intermediate 
1relationships –‘how groups are internally organized’ – obtains depending on the nature of inter-
group relationships. or‘what other groups are doing’. 
In particular, I show that when value arises from appropriating resources from other groups, 
inter-group relationships are conflictual or war–like, with the consequence that intra-group 
relationships are centralized and hierarchical. By contrast, when the value creation process involves 
niche-competition among groups, inter-group relationships are fission-fusion with commitment, and 
intra-group relationships are decentralized and egalitarian. Finally, when value derives from 
appropriating occasional benefits from cooperation, inter-group relationships are fission-fusion 
without commitment, or indistinguishable from intra-group relationships, and the latter are 
decentralized and hierarchical.  
The alternative between hierarchy and egalitarianism should be understood in both the 
organizational and the distributional senses because it refers to how decisions are taken (by fiat or 
by consensus) and to how surplus is distributed (by appropriating or sharing). The alternative 
between decentralization and centralization, instead, should be understood according to whether or 
not recruitment and enforcement are spontaneous.  
Thus, the paper combines a human agency perspective – the intra-group interaction among 
individuals determines social structures such as institutional rules and enforcement mechanisms – 
with a structural perspective – the inter-group interaction among structures determines the social 
treatment of individual natural differences. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I illustrate the argument, 
establishing links with contemporary institutional thought. Interpreting intra-group relationships as 
different forms of social order and the division of labour, section 3 provides applications to political 
and economic institutions. Finally, section 4 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Value, distribution and exploitation 
 
According to the neo-Ricardian critique, neo-classical economics mistakenly applies the 
categories of exchange to production, a phenomenon which is different in nature because of the 
transforming of inputs into output over time, with the consequent characterization of variables in 
terms of flows rather than stocks. This in turn is seen as fundamentally deriving from a subjective 
theory of value based on utility, at the expense of an objective theory of value based on cost.  
According to the Marxian critique of the ‘abstract man’, the same point can be made a 
fortiori concerning those new-institutional analyses based on the Coasean insight that the 
institutional structures of production – and indeed institutions in general – can be explained in terms 
of a ‘meta-exchange’ of property rights between individuals not affected by wealth effects (Coase, 
1937; 1960; 1992). The most illustrative example is the asymmetric information explanation of 
liberation from slavery (Barzel, 1997, ch. 7). By concealing the true cost of his effort, the slave 
could save valuable resources and, perhaps, even borrow the amount needed to buy back his 
freedom. While one can be totally persuaded that things may have gone like this, and probably 
should have done so, the problem is that they did not. What is missing is the effect of society on 
individuals (how the slave came to think that he did not deserve to be a slave) and that of history on 
society (how the mode of production shifted from feudalism to capitalism). 
In this paper I side with the spirit of these critiques but focus on a different contrast between 
exchange and production. I contend that the former is basically an individual phenomenon while the 
latter is basically a collective phenomenon, in the group or team sense defined in footnote 4.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
between the two – the definition has a clear and definite economic meaning in the notion of team production, that is, in 
the notion of the non-separability and non-additivity of production functions (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). An 
important class of production functions which are non-separable and non-additive comprises those that exhibit strategic 
complementarities. Note that the definition itself of strategic complementarity (a positive cross-partial derivative) 
provides an intuitive link with the sociological definition: the whole is not the sum of its parts because the latter 
transform themselves in the production process. 
2This is particularly important if one accepts an investment-driven view of the value creation 
process, for exchange is involved in only one case out of four: that where the creating-value 
investments are made singly both at inception and realization (as in craftsmanship and traditional 
agriculture, for example).
5 The binding nature of this autarchy option, and the consequent 
characterization of exchange as voluntary, when coupled with competition, gives rise to a highly 
idealized situation in which every individual is totally indifferent to the presence or the absence of 
all others, not sensing any effect from their actions (see footnote 18).  
However, in the other three cases (when the investments are made collectively both at 
inception and realization; when the investments are made collectively but realized singly; or when 
the investments are made singly but realized collectively), the value creation process involves a 
collective component at least at some stage. Whence derive the three issues of how collective 
decisions on how the single parts should combine to produce the whole result are taken, how they 
are enforced, and how surplus value is distributed.  
  The categories of exchange between given individuals and individual choice, with 
individuals giving up authority according to comparative advantages and being paid for their 
individual contribution,
6 are not necessarily enough to handle these three issues, because they are 
ultimately based on the relation between an individual’s contribution and what it can command 
elsewhere. But it is only when investments are made singly both at inception and realization that 
individual reward, the value of individual contribution, and what it can command elsewhere may 
coincide (if output markets are to remain competitive). In the other three cases of collective 
investments and team production, what individuals can command elsewhere is no longer connected 
with an individual’s contribution (which is not directly measurable) but depends on the nature of 
inter-group relationships (the next best alternatives are in other groups). And, in turn, the latter may 
be seen as determined by the value creation process and as at least partly shaping the very 
individual characteristics which drive choice and exchange. For this reason, individual rewards 
comprise a socially determined component depending on mechanisms exogenous to every 
individual in the group but endogenous to group behavior (see also footnote 10 below).   
Whilst the usual assumption of no wealth effects is approximately true in the case of firms’ 
relationships, it creates additional problems in the present context. When invalid as it is in human 
relations in general and in the labour market in particular, power and distribution are intrinsically 
linked from the outset, individual-level and group-level value maximization processes do not push 
the system in the same direction, and the analysis of their interaction apparently becomes necessary 
because bargaining positions cannot be treated as exogenous and unimportant.  
Even the recent approach of the economics of conflict (Hirshleifer, 1991, 1995; Skaperdas, 
1992; Muthoo, 2004; see also Piccione and Rubinstein, 2005, and Acemoglou et al., 2005), 
although it correctly points to the reality of explicit coercion, involuntary exchange and the relation 
between power and distribution, does not seem entirely satisfying. As in much of the Marxian 
tradition, in fact, in this literature the issue of domination vs. cooperation, mainly with respect to the 
emergence of social order from a blank-slate state of nature, is solved in terms of exogenous 
asymmetries (or symmetries) of power between the parties involved. In turn, the latter are 
associated with individual characteristics such as initial endowments, comparative advantages in 
specialization, and time preferences. But, again, the main thrust of the paper is that these parameters 
                                                 
5 I call ‘inception’ and ‘realization’ the two stages necessarily implied by the definition of investment as the current 
employment of resources to increase future production. An investment-driven view of the value creation process is 
agnostic as to the philosophical question of why people (should) attach value to things or relationships. It merely takes 
account of the fact that if an increase in the value of production occurs, there must have been prior investments to obtain 
the result.  The decomposition into the two stages of inception and realization, and the various ways in which individual 
and collective components can combine, seems particularly consistent with the current characterizations of the economy 
as a ‘knowledge economy’. As for history, according to Mokyr (2002), not even the Industrial Revolution was simply 
the result of ‘Smithian’ growth. See sub-section 3.2. 
6 The case for shifting the margin of analysis from commodities to individuals, in light of the recent advances in the 
economics of asymmetric information and opportunism, is convincingly put forward by Makovski and Ostroy (2001). 
3are better viewed not as exogenous but as emerging from more complex interactions between 
individual-level and group-level selection mechanisms. Sharing the same individualistic 
methodology of the new-institutional perspective outlined above, then, the same point about the 
collective nature of most human activity and its consequences on the relation between individual 
contribution and the next best alternative can be made about the basic analytical tool of the 
literature: the choice between producing and predating in terms of opportunity cost.
7  
Hence, as an illustration, suppose there are n individuals and m groups. It may help to 
conceive the within-group situation not in terms of the dyadic interactions typical of game theory 
but in terms of a would-be leader or dominant individual facing a group of would-be followers or 
subordinates (Veherencamp, 1983; see also Betzig, 1992).  
Because of the collective nature of production, intra-group decisions are taken not 
independently but conjointly, that is, hierarchically or by consensus. The assumption is that 
whoever is empowered to decide how single parts combine to produce the whole result does so by 
maximizing his share of the surplus, taking account of the characteristics of the accompanying 
investments and of group members’ outside options. The identity of the decision-maker is 
determined by the nature of inter-group relationships, which in turn are assumed to depend on 
group-level selection mechanisms also driven by the logic of value maximization, in this case group 
value maximization (fig. 1). 
This last assumption is of course a crucial one rationalized by the fact that, when value-
creation occurs in groups, inter-group relationships also represent the way in which groups form (by 
conflict or by fission-fusion). Variation among groups, at this stage, is selected more rapidly and 
more forcefully than individual variation. In the first place, therefore, those who survive may be 
legitimately seen as emerging from inter-group relationships which maximize group value.  
In other words, the general situation that I want to represent with this assumption is not one 
of given individuals in a Hobbesian or Lockean state of nature who have to decide whether or not to 
associate; rather, it is one where malleable individuals confront a population of groups, being 
sometimes in a position to choose the group, sometimes not, sometimes with this choice making a 




Next, suppose that value arises from appropriating resources from other groups, which is a 
between-group competitive push as in much of the history of relationships among states including 
colonialism, or market-share competition in a stable industry. Group-level mechanisms driven by 
the logic of maximizing group value imply that inter-group relationships are conflictual or war-like. 
                                                 
7 The approach closest to that of the present paper is taken by Hirshleifer (1995), where the distribution of resources 
plays an important role in determining the corresponding type of social order. Non-defendable resources lead to 
‘scramble competition’, defendable and dispersed resources lead to stable anarchy, while defendable but concentrated 
resources lead to despotism. The other drivers of the model are the ‘technology of conflict’ – which measures the extent 
to which resources devoted to fighting translate into probabilities of success – and initial endowements.  
VALUE 








4Groups form through conquest so that rigged belonging and the lack of outside options means that 
the identity of the parties is relevant both before and after the value-creating investments are made. 
The same investments, on the other hand, are made collectively both at inception and realization (as 
in the preparation and actual conduct of war, or in on-the-job training). As a consequence, intra-
group relationships are hierarchical and centralized. The dominant individual or elite, more 
powerful or richer because of the successful previous conflict and unrestricted because of the 
subordinates’ impossibility to change group, takes control of the operations and appropriates the 
surplus value. Recruitment and enforcement, on the other hand, are not spontaneous but instead 
need explicit coercion and separate monitoring systems, again because of the subordinates’ 
impossibility to go elsewhere and their lack of ‘positive’ incentives (fig.2, upper-left box).  
Consider now the case where value arises from niche competition, a between-group 
opportunity pull as in the case of the hunter-gatherer economies which dominated most of human 
history, or the discovery of new professional fields such as, say, class action (fig.2, box in the 
middle). Group-level selective pressures imply in this case that the most successful groups emerge 
from inter-group relationships which are fission-fusion with commitment, since groups last until the 
niche is exploited but need an initial collective move. This implies that the identity of the parties is 
not relevant before the investments are made (individuals can choose the group) but only 
afterwards, for investments are made collectively at inception but realized singly (as when hunters 
move into a particular area and the prey is caught by the most proficient hunter, or when the 
direction of knowledge development is set by the scientific and technical community but 
innovations are made by individual researchers). Accordingly, inter-group relationships are 
egalitarian (command of the initial investment process is in the hands of the group, which 
appropriates and redistributes the surplus) and decentralized (i.e., self-enforcing, because both 
membership decisions and the punishment of group norm deviations are undertaken by single 
individuals
8).  Note how inter-group relationships establish the identity of the decision-maker: 
groups form periodically on the basis of individual choice, and the naturally dominant individuals 
must restrain themselves because otherwise they would not be accepted in any group for fear that, 
on realizing the investments singly, they might appropriate the entire surplus (as exemplified by the 
non-compete clauses commonly used in partnerships, to anticipate one application from the next 
section).  
Finally, take the case where value arises from appropriating occasional benefits from 
cooperation, a within-group competitive push as in occasional defence against predation in anarcho-
individualistic human and non-human societies, or arms-length labour-market relationships (fig.2, 
lower-right box). Since there is no point in having stable groups, group-level mechanisms maximize 
group value by determining fission-fusion inter-group relationships, so that they become 
indistinguishable from intra-group relationships. Investments are made singly at inception but need 
a collective realization (as when a new car, for instance, is designed in the developed world and 
actually produced in a developing country, or, more generally, when individuals acquire in their 
youth the basic educational levels increasingly required at all stages of the value chain). Hence each 
party needs another one to complete the investment but is indifferent to who the latter party actually 
is (the identities of the parties are irrelevant both before and after investments are made). Intra-
group relationships are therefore hierarchical and decentralized. Previously successful surplus-
takers are able to dominate the realization of the investments because of their relatively small 
number, while enforcement and recruitment are spontaneous because subordinates have no reason 
                                                 
8 Usually, individual punishment of group norm deviations is seen as a second-order public good problem and is 
therefore explained in terms of (group-selection evolved) non-selfish preferences. They are not necessary in the present 
context because individuals are motivated by fear of expropriation of the collective components of the investment. 
Capturing the effect of group-level explanatory mechanisms on beliefs, preferences and self-understanding is, however, 
one of the most important achievements one can hope for by focusing on them. See the next section and the 
conclusions.  
5to expect better terms elsewhere but cannot realize the investment singly. This is of course a case of 
involuntary exchange.
9  
Schematically, the above reasoning can be therefore represented as in fig. 2. 
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The final comment concerns the notion of exploitation. In the present context, individual 
contribution and rewards are not directly measurable and valued as they are when investments are 
made singly both at inception and realization (an individual and conflict–free? within-group 
opportunity pull corresponding in effect to the institution-free framework of general competitive 
analysis).
10 
                                                 
9 I do not claim that the categories of exchange and choice are logically flawed for this kind of analysis, because the 
autarchy option is always available – by committing suicide to provide an already-mentioned dramatic example. The 
point of inserting intermediate entitities between individuals and society is that the framework forces consideration of 
the alternatives available in other groups; an option (or a constraint) usually not discussed in state of nature approaches, 
where given individuals choose whether or not to associate from the outset?. In this sense, exchange may be involuntary 
if individuals are not autonomous in their decisions on production. Nor, of course, do I think that there are no natural 
differences among indivduals (and so no gains to be realized by specialization according to comparative advantage), or 
claim that such differences are entirely determined socially as assumed in the text. The best way to see the three cases 
above is to think of how natural differences are modified by the operation of the group-level selective mechanism: 
respectively, they are amplified, reduced, and left intact.  
10 When individual contribution is not directly measurable, there is naturally Alchian and Demsetz’s (neo-Hobbesian) 
solution of a monitor who specializes in metering individual productivity, reversing the market-based causal 
relationship from productivity to rewards. Note, however, that the supervisor promises to pay according to individual 
productivity, and that the corresponding motivation of the worker to make a greater effort because of the gains with 
respect to unmonitored teams may be invalidated by considering the nature of inter-group relationships and the 
characteristics of the value creation process. When inter-group relationships are conflictual or war-like, the workers 
have no alternatives, so the supervisor can break the promise, obtaining the desired amount of effort by explicit 
coercion and direct monitoring. When inter-group relationships are fission-fusion with commitment, the workers’ 
alternative may be better than paying the supervisor because of the group sharing rules, so that the solution is disrupted 
by the supervised. Finally, when inter-group relationships are fission-fusion, or indistinguishable from intra-group 
6 They are instead partly determined socially by the interaction between individual-level and 
group-level selection mechanisms. Exploitation, therefore, cannot be conceived as a lack of 
correspondence between the two, but must be taken as the non-sharing of the fruits of collective 
efforts. Consequently, institutions are not the anticipated solution to the problem of exploitation as 
in the hold-up inspired theories of the firm of Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985) or 
the Property Rights Approach (Hart, 1995); rather, they may be the very conditions for its 
occurrence, even without explicit coercion. The next section tests this conclusion and the preceding 




Social order and the division of labour are two basic and time-honored subjects in both 
economics and sociology. They have been prominent examples of the individualistic and the 
structuralist methodologies mentioned in the Introduction, and they are the subject of the theoretical 
perspectives discussed in the previous section. It is for this reason that they have been chosen as 
preferred fields to apply the preceding argument. To restrict a discussion which otherwise would be 
too general, however, they will only be treated through a few examples of political and economic 
institutions cited as different ways to solve the problems that they pose. 
A specific definition of the term ‘institution’ is now in order, and it seems to me that the 
most simple and appropriate one is that by North (1990), where institutions are defined as (formal 
and informal) rules and their enforcement mechanisms.
11 A further restriction is that such political 
and economic institutions are also distributive institutions, as follows from the fact that the value 
creation process is taken as the exogenous engine of the proposed evolutionary framework and that 
the assumption of no wealth effects is dropped. 
Even with these qualifications, I am not able to cover all the related literature and am forced 
to deal with it rather selectively. Political institutions will be discussed in the following sub-section, 
while economic institutions will be treated in sub-section 3.2. 
 
3.1. Political institutions 
 
According to Taylor (1987), there are four characteristics which help to define social order: 
absence of actual violence, respect of life and property, conformity, and predictability.  
The three kinds of political institutions which, in equilibrium, are understood as embodying 
the rules associated with a particular form of social order in the sense just delineated, and 
corresponding to the three types of intra-group relationships discussed in the preceding section, are 
the primitive States, the egalitarian communities, and the anarcho-individualistic human and non-
human societies (fig.3). They have been chosen not only because human evolution passed through 
them in a rough (and reverse) temporal sequence, but also because, while exhausting the theoretical 
spectrum of the possible solutions to the problem of social order,
12 the link between the economic 
and the political realms is, in such cases, more evident and clear-cut than in our times. 
As for the emergence of State organization, meant as the emergence of social stratification 
between a ruling elite and a ruled mass of subordinate individuals, with separate enforcement 
apparatuses such as the military, law administration and religion, anthropological research for the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
relationships, the supervisor can exploit his natural position on the short side of the market and obtain the desired effort 
by using the stick of the threat of dismissal rather than the carrot of an improved match between productivity and 
rewards. Also note that, because of the characteristics of the investments – made singly at inception but realized 
collectively – in this latter case there is no need for the enforcement rent typically resulting from efficiency wage 
models. See Bowles, 1985. 
11 North has subsequently abandoned his famous distinction between institutions as rules of the game and organizations 
as players. See Hodgson (2006).   
12 The fourth possibility, that of centralized and egalitarian rule, has predictably proven impossible since the end of the 
Communist era. 
7most part reflects the divide between the Hobbesian and the Marxian perspectives (respectively, 
Service, 1975, and Fried, 1967). In the former case, individuals accept the authority of the State to 
restrain their natural anti-social tendencies so as fully to enjoy the benefits of cooperative group 
living.
13 In the latter, State organization is the result of a within-group struggle for scarce resources 
among competing (sub)-groups.  
Whilst the evidence may not be conclusive notwithstanding the abundance of examples and 
counter-examples (Cohen, 1978), a third, convincing, and well-established perspective is that of 
‘circumscription theory’ (Carneiro, 1970; see also Allen, 1997). Here, State organization is the 
result of wars fought between different populations living in geographically or socially 
circumscribed areas such as those of Latin America and the Middle East. In other words, it is seen 
as the result of external conflicts.  The impossibility for the conquered population to flee to other 
lands explains its subjugation to the victorious one, which gives rise to a situation which perfectly 
matches the above case of intra-group hierarchical and centralized relationships chosen by a value-
maximizing decision-maker whose identity is determined by conflictual or war-like inter-group 
relationships. Sedentarism and agriculture, as necessary but not sufficient conditions for the theory, 
when coupled with the notion of circumscription, are of course a revealing case of a between-group 
competitive push value creation process consisting of the appropriation of land resources from other 
groups (fig.3, upper-left box). 
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As for egalitarian communities (fig.3, box in the middle),  the ones most studied are of 
course those of hunter-gatherers (Kelly, 1995; Boehm, 1999). If human history is represented on the 
scale of a single day, they gave way to agricultural sedentarists at ten minutes to midnight, and in 
fact continue to struggle for survival in some remote areas of the world?. Naturally, in this case, too, 
there is debate about the nature of their distinctive characteristics: the substantial absence of social 
                                                 
13 This is also the stateof-nature framework of the models explaining the emergence of the State in the economics of 
conflict: starting from the basic trade-off between productive and predatory activities, the emergence of an ordered 
society results from a ‘contractarian’ approach in which the reduction of destructive violence (or improvements in the 
incentives  to work due to a better protection of property rights against internal threats) is balanced against the potential 
despotism of the ‘king’ (or  simply the dilution of incentives to work deriving from the duty to pay taxes). See Bates, 
Greif, and Singh, 2002, and Grossman, 2002.  
 
8stratification and leadership, extensive food sharing, effective and decentralized punishment of 
individual deviations from group norms, and generally peaceful inter-group relationships (Knauft, 
1991). But, although approaches insisting on their basically kin-based composition do exist (Earle 
and Johnson, 1987), the mainstream tends to see them, and the theoretical problem of cooperation 
that they pose, in terms of the various meanings attached to the notion of reciprocity, currently a 
major subject in experimental economics as well.
14 
For the purpose of the present analysis it is sufficient to note that the features of such 
hunting economies are consistent with the previous argument that, when value arises from niche-
competition among groups, inter-group relationships are fission-fusion with commitment (hunting 
groups periodically form to reach unexploited areas and remain together for the duration of the 
hunting season, which obviously may vary depending on environmental factors). Consequently, 
intra-group relationships are egalitarian (in the absence of social stratification, decisions on where 
to move are typically reached by consensus, while food sharing is extensive
15) and decentralized 
(both membership decisions and enforcement of the group’s rules are spontaneous, see footnote 8).  
Interestingly, if dominance and submission are taken to be the most salient natural 
tendencies that we humans share with our closest primate relatives, and the hunter-gatherer 
communities are correspondingly seen as the domination of the group of would-be subordinates on 
the would-be dominant individual for fear of his appropriative attitudes (Boehm, 1999), an 
intriguing parallel can be drawn with modern democracies, where leaders are given power under a 
strict system of checks and balances and mandatory clauses to dislodge them from office.
16    
  Finally, it is not coincidence that explains why it is difficult to find examples of human 
anarcho-individualistic societies (fig.3, lower-right box). The reality, in fact, is that we humans are 
by far the most social species in the animal kingdom (with the possible exception of eusocial 
insects).  
Among solitary species, examples of fission-fusion bands composed of a dominant leader 
and a flexible group of subordinates abound, the closest to humans being the case of gorillas. The 
silverback, as the group leader is called, decides the timing and the direction of the group’s 
movements, and his dominant position translates into the domain of distribution, as reflected by the 
silverback’s exclusive access to his harem of fellow females. The latter are the only permanent 
members of the group, while other males – usually younger and/or weaker – occasionally band 
together? to reap the benefits from enhanced defence against predation, and then leave with the 
hope of creating their own group or, if unsuccessful, of joining other groups under the same 
conditions (Watts, 1996). 
As for humans, a way out of the problem would be to refer to pre-anatomically modern 
humans: that is, to the stage preceding the Paleolithic period. Because nothing is known about 
human social groups before the hunter-gatherer era, the standard method is that of ‘triangulating’ to 
human nature by attributing to the Common Ancestor the characteristics possessed by all its 
descendants: we humans and our closest non-human primate relatives – gorillas, chimpanzees and 
bonobos (Wrangham, 1987; see also Knauft, 1991).
17  On the one hand, hierarchy (as a way to take 
                                                 
14 See Trivers (1971) for reciprocal altruism, Alexander (1987) for indirect reciprocity, and Gintis (2000) for strong 
reciprocity. See also Boyd, Bowles, Fehr and Gintis, 2005, for a more comprehensive treatment of the debate and its 
impact on economics. 
15 This is not to say that the most proficient hunters are not rewarded in related domains such as reproductive success 
(Kaplan and Hill, 1985). Nor does it imply a universal, perhaps perfectly egalitarian, rule. In fact, each group seems to 
have its own habits (Henrich et al., 2001). The point is the social nature of the determination of the particular sharing 
rule and the particular meaning attached to the notion of individual contribution. 
16 But of course modern democracies can also be seen as an exchange between individuals with a preference for public 
life and individuals with a preference for private life. 
17 The method receives widespread agreement because it is conservative: were the traits attributed to the Common 
Ancestor not possessed by all its descendants, they would have had to appear two times independently. Gorillas are a 
species which diverged first (8 m years ago), then came chimpanzees (5 m years ago), with bonobos diverging from 
them about 2m years ago. The percentages of the DNA structure that we share with those non-human primate species 
are in an astonishing range between 90% and more than 98%. 
9decisions and distribute the surplus) and decentralization (as a spontaneous way to determine 
membership and to enforce group rules) are known to all such species. On the other, the superior 
group cohesion of chimpanzees, bonobos, and of course humans may be attributed to later, food-
related adaptations moving away from the (within-group competitive push) value creation process 
associated with individuals gathering vegetables during the day and grouping at night to avoid 
predation. Hence, much of what has been said about gorillas can be repeated for pre-anatomically-
modern humans. 
  Theoretically, though, the political arrangement under discussion corresponds to stable 
anarchy, when ‘anarchy’ is given the meaning of the absence of power outside single individuals.
18 
Note that this is the case of neither primitive States, which were hereditary, nor hunter-gatherer 
communities, where authority was exercised by the group. Obviously, this is also a degenerate case 
of social order, where the fulfillment of the last of Taylor’s conditions – predictability – may be 
lost. A usual example of this situation is provided by international relations (with nations intended 
as single individuals). 
 
3.2. Economic Institutions 
 
Though the division of labour was a central theme in the work of the founding fathers of 
both economics and sociology, surprisingly little progress has been made since then (Ghiselin, 
1978).  
Smith (1976, ch.1), with his legendary example of the pin factory, and the theorem that the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, seems to imply that there are no other 
limits to the increase in production achievable with ever more minute specialization and the 
associated gains from trade expansion. But Smith contradicts himself because he does not seem to 
realize that, precisely in the pin factory, the division of labour is not coordinated by the market. A 
better example in this regard would be that of the hunters and shepherds exchanging bows and 
arrows for venison in the subsequent chapter (see Pagano, 1985, ch.1). As often with Smith, 
however, the complexity of the full argument also allows for other interpretations. Specialization, 
gains from trade, and impersonal exchange are not the only sources of growth in his book, but are 
mixed with a ‘classical’ labour theory of value. A contradiction between annihilating the workers’ 
tasks and their capacity for learning by doing and innovating within the firm, therefore, can also be 
recognized in later parts of his book (Smith, 1976, fifth book; Pagano, 1985, ch.2).  
Smith’s followers who revert to the invisible hand framework in any case, certainly refer to 
situations where investments are made singly both at inception and realization when they state that 
the three classical benefits from specialization are fully available only to the extent that the single 
task can be expelled from the productive process and stay independently on market (Stigler, 1951). 
 Durkheim (1893), on the other hand, with his idea that the division of labour fulfills the 
purpose of guaranteeing a given ‘solidaritè sociale’, illuminates the role of the group-level 
determinants of the phenomenon, to the point of anticipating the notion that norms perform the role 
of covering the holes of contractual incompleteness (Durkheim, 1893, ch.7). But he does not seem 
to grasp the conflictual and distributional aspects of the problem (Braverman, 1974).
19  
                                                 
18 By ‘stable anarchy’ I mean a situation where individuals refrain from attacking other indivduals (Hirshleifer, 1995). 
In other approaches, instead, the complete realization of individual autonomy requires the existence of communitarian 
rules (see Taylor, 1987, in general, and Gardner, 1991, for hunter-gatherer communities). Naturally, its literal meaning 
of the absence of power is ideally and beautifully incorporated into general competitive equilibrium analysis. 
19 Obviously, in my view, the profoundest contribution of the time was made by Marx. According to him, the division 
of labour is the other half of production relations (here intra-group relationships), in turn dependent on the productive 
forces (here the value creation process). His labour theory of value and his identification of production relations with 
property relations alone, however, forced a failed preconization of an ever more extensive extraction of surplus labour 
from workers, and prevented appreciation of the ubiquity of the problem of cooperation in production and of the various 
forms that unequal exchange can take.   
10Exploiting a few stylized facts, therefore, I will distinguish economic institutions according 
to whether the rules of the division of labour embodied in a given team production process are 
vertical or horizontal (corresponding to the case of intra-group hierarchical or egalitarian 
relationships), and according to whether or not enforcement is spontaneous (corresponding to the 
case of intra-group relationships, decentralized or otherwise). As before, the latter distinction is 
understood both in the sense of the existence of a separate monitoring system and in the sense of 
how recruitment occurs, the former with a focus on distributional consequences, in addition to the 
organizational element (fig. 4). 
Accordingly, the box to the upper left pertains to the classical firm. With respect to inter-
group relationships, the characterization as conflictual or war-like follows from the absence of trade 
in ownership shares, and, mostly, from the absence of outside options (until two generations ago, 
Pirelli, an important Italian manufacturer, provided housing for its workforce, and lifelong 
employment was almost universal until the last generation). On the other hand, the early obsession 
with increasing the volume of production, without much concern to increase the size of the market 
by operating on the demand side, confirms that  inter-group relationships can be interpreted as 
resulting from a value creation process consisting of appropriating resources (market shares) from 
other groups. As for intra-group relationships, there is little doubt that Taylorism before cold-war 
Keynesism was hierarchical in both the distributional and the organizational senses, and that it 
necessitated a separate monitoring apparatus (Braverman, 1974). In regard to recruitment, the point 
is so important and so mixed with the assumed value creation process and the subtle dogma of 
individual choice that it warrants a lengthy quotation from Mokyr (2002, p.128, emphasis added): 
‘For the economist, it is a logical puzzle why, in the absence of coercion, workers would voluntarily 
agree to work in factories if doing so reduced their utility. Many workers were paid a factory or a 
coal-mine premium as a compensating differential, and workers were provided with benefits such as 
housing, schooling for their children, and even milch cows (…). Insofar as this was inadequate, 
however, factory owners, especially in the countryside, relied on pauper children and orphans 
‘borrowed’ from workhouses. Beyond that, however, the economic logic of the Industrial 
Revolution implied that workers might end up working in factories even if it made them worse off 
than they were before (though not worse off than if they stayed at home). The reason is that 
opportunity cost of many of these potential factory employees was set by by what they could earn in 
the cottage industry. This alternative declined rapidly because of factory competition and by 1850 
was, in most cases, no longer available. The factories, by relentlessly driving down the price of 
manufactured goods, reduced the earnings of those working at home and thus forced them (or their 
offsprings) to abandon their cottages and seek work in the mills or to emigrate.’. 
  The box in the middle can be allocated instead to partnerships, with their typical up-or-out 
promotion rules, non-compete clauses, flat hierarchies and profit-sharing schemes (Rayan and 
Zingales, 1998; Levin and Tadelis, 2005).  The relative mobility of professional workers and the 
dynamic nature of working at the frontier of scientific and technical knowledge seem to apply to the 
case of inter-group fission-fusion relationships with commitment (up-or-out promotion rules, non-
compete clauses). In turn, the latter can be seen as implied by a between-group opportunity pull 
value creation process fuelled by investments made collectively at inception but realized singly.
20 
Flat hierarchies and profit-sharing are obvious examples of egalitarianism as defined above (see 
footnote 15), while the contemporary notion of ‘occupation community’ (Tolbert, 1996; Marsden, 
2004) suggests that the decentralized punishment of individual violators of community norms may 
be quite effective (no doubt the recruitment of professionals stems from individual choices).  
  Finally, the box to the lower right is occupied by the ‘putting-out system’. The absence of 
stable orders and the interlocking nature of the relations between the ‘putter-outers’ and 
independent workers is a proxy for inter-group relationships indistinguishable from intra-group 
                                                 
20 After their detailed analysis of the specialization of lawyers in law firms, Garricano and Hubbard (2003) conclude 
that ‘Lawyers are more likely to work at the same firm with lawyers in their own field than with lawyers from any other 
field’ (p.30).  
11relationships. Their hierarchical and decentralized character, on the other hand, can be appreciated 
in light of the following quotation from Marglin (1974, p. 81), which also offers an example of 
investments made singly at inception but realized collectively: ‘The minute specialization that was 
the hallmark of the putting-out system only wiped out one of two aspects of workers’ control of 
production: control over the product. Control of the work process, when and how much the worker 
would exert himself, remained with the worker until the coming of the factory’. His well-known 
view of the putter-outer’s profits as due to interposing a new figure between the producer and the 
market, therefore, is simultaneously an illustration of the within-group competitive push value 
creation process which drives the analysis in this case, and a reminder of the preceding situation, 
one of the few examples of investments – those of apprentices taking the place of the masters – 
made singly both at inception and realization.   
Closer to our times, moreover, there is the contemporary ‘global’ firm viewed as an instance 
of intra-group relationships between unskilled workers and management.
21 The extensive 
development of capital markets and trade in shares, the progressive erosion of geographical limits to 
delocalization, and the fact that long-term contracts are not on offer to unskilled workers, fit the 
description of fission-fusion inter-group relationships generated by a value creation process 
consisting of appropriating occasional benefits from cooperation. The division of labour remains 
decidedly vertical and the earnings gap between capital and labour is widening enormously, so that 
intra-group relationships are hierarchical in both the organizational and the distributional senses. As 
to their self-enforcing nature, as previously noted, the increasing need for at least a minimal degree 
of education of the workforce in order to keep pace with technological progress may be taken as an 
example of investments which are made singly but need a collective realization. From this follows 
the progressive substitution of enforcement systems based on direct monitoring with those based on 
the threat of dismissal, and the involuntary nature of the implied exchange. 
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21 Professional workers within such firms, i.e. managers, are rather perplexing in the framework proposed. The rules 
governing the division of labour in this case appear indeed hierarchical in the organizational sense and egalitarian in the 
distributional sense. This may be due to their dual nature as agents for owners and principals of workers. Tellingly, in a 
world of perfect separation between ownership and control, they could have been placed in the same category as 
partnerships. 
12To conclude this section on real examples of the framework proposed, the last point to be 
made concerns the problem of institutional change. Whilst in the case of the political institutions 
discussed exogenous changes in the value creation process (from gathering to hunting to 
agriculture) are enough to explain the observed trajectory of  changes in the institutional structure, 
matters become more complicated as far the economic institutions of this sub-section are concerned. 
On the one hand, the industrial revolution and information technology are both such big pushes that 
the change from the putting-out system to the classical firm, and that from Keynesian Taylorism to 
the contemporary ‘global’ firm, could be easily accommodated. But on the other hand, more 
complex determinants such as ideologically and culturally driven institutional changes (such as the 
unions and the stock exchange, for example) have played a comparable role in the period. 
Moreover, as Marglin’s analysis suggests, there is the unresolved Marxian issue of whether 
technology is always the exogenous driver of the institutional structure, or whether it is also a result 
of given institutional arrangements (Pagano and Rowthorn, 1994). 
Given the general point that knowledge is not only technological but also social, such 
problems actually indicate the main theoretical deficiency of the framework proposed: the effect of 
structures on beliefs, preferences and self-understanding so as to allow for endogenous cultural and 
ideological institutional change. In terms of fig. 1, to put it another way, this would amount to 
analyzing the reverse causation mechanisms from given intra-group relationships to the value 
creation process passing through inter-group relationships. The complexity of the problem suggests 
that it should be left as a possible direction for future research. 
   
4. Conclusions 
 
One risks not controversy but banality when emphasizing the role of groups in social life in 
general and in the value-creation process in particular. What may be more interesting is that 
belonging to a particular group changes one’s perception of opportunities and constraints (as when 
one can be the star of a mediocre team or a mediocre player of a top team), and that for the most 
part the groups to which one could belong will continue their existence in their actual form 
independently of one’s choices (universities have their own intellectual traditions, for example). It is 
also true, of course, that groups owe their existence to some individual, but in the normal course of 
events individuals do not choose the way in which groups interact: sometimes they can choose the 
group, sometimes not, sometimes this choice makes a difference, sometimes it does not. 
To describe this kind of situation, in this paper I have analysed the interaction between 
individuals and groups, seeking to avoid both the so-called ‘under-socialized’ actor of economics 
and the ‘over-socialized’ actor of sociology. Borrowing insights from biology, I have framed 
institutional evolution in terms of an investment-driven value creation process occurring both within 
and between groups, put aside the neo-classical case of a within-group individual opportunity pull 
because of the implied absence of value-creating institutions, and concentrated on the other three 
cases of collective investments and team production. I have then investigated what kind of intra-
group institutional structure obtains given the nature of the inter-group interaction among structures. 
The latter are assumed to be dependent on group value-maximizing  selective pressures and, in turn, 
to determine the identity of the intra-group decision-makers, who then choose the former, 
maximizing their share of the surplus value taking account of the characteristics of the 
accompanying investment process and of group members’ outside options.  
The two main results of this inquiry are: (i) the parameters driving the results in the formal 
models of the emergence of social order from given individuals in the state of nature can also be 
seen as the results of more complex interactions involving a social component exogenous to every 
individual in the group but endogenous to group behavior; in particular, the special configurations 
ensuring ‘balanced’ forms of social order are not fortunate coincidences but require the relentless 
operation of group-level sharing rules; (ii) when value-creation occurs in groups, individual 
contributions to surplus value and individual rewards have a socially determined component, so that 
13exploitation can be defined, not as a lack of correspondence between the two, but as the non-sharing 
of the fruits of collective efforts; institutions can therefore be the cause of actual exploitation rather 
than the solution to its anticipated possible existence. 
Naturally, this is only the first and easiest step towards integrating individual-level and 
group-level explanatory mechanisms, for it is simply the addition of a further constraint – the nature 
of inter-group relationships – on value-maximizing individuals affected by wealth effects. It seems 
to me that two fields in which an improved understanding of the subject may prove rewarding are 
the theory of distribution and decision theory. 
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